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Research

Cross-Scale Value Trade-Offs in Managing Social-Ecological Systems:
The Politics of Scale in Ruaha National Park, Tanzania
Asim Zia 1, Paul Hirsch 2, Alexander Songorwa 3, David R. Mutekanga 4, Sheila O'Connor 5, Thomas McShane 5,
Peter Brosius 6, and Bryan Norton 7
ABSTRACT. Management of social-ecological systems takes place amidst complex governance processes and cross-scale
institutional arrangements that are mediated through politics of scale. Each management scenario generates distinct cross-scale
trade-offs in the distribution of pluralistic values. This study explores the hypothesis that conservation-oriented management
scenarios generate higher value for international and national scale social organizations, whereas mixed or more balanced
management scenarios generate higher value for local scale social organizations. This hypothesis is explored in the management
context of Ruaha National Park (RNP), Tanzania, especially the 2006 expansion of RNP that led to the eviction of many
pastoralists and farmers. Five management scenarios for RNP, i.e., national park, game reserve, game control area, multiple use
area, and open area, are evaluated in a multicriteria decision analytical framework on six valuation criteria: economic welfare;
good governance; socio-cultural values; social equity; ecosystem services; and biodiversity protection; and at three spatial scales:
local, national, and international. Based upon this evaluation, we discuss the politics of scale that ensue from the implementation
of management alternatives with different mixes of conservation and development goals in social-ecological systems.
Key Words: biodiversity conservation; complexity; ecological valuation; economic development; politics of scale; socialecological systems; trade-off analysis
INTRODUCTION
The tension between conservation and development
objectives across the globe is a function of many complex
issues (Hirsch et al. 2011, McShane et al. 2011), one of which
concerns how to trade off pluralistic values associated with
anthropogenic environmental change occurring at multiple
scales of space and time. Recently, a considerable amount of
research and scholarship has been devoted to understanding
the cross-scale trade-offs that ensue from the management of
social-ecological systems at multiple levels of social
organization (e.g., Berkes 2002, 2006, Adger et al. 2005,
Brown and Purcell 2005, Lebel et al. 2005, Rodriguez et al.
2006, Silver 2008). This study is an attempt to analyze crossscale trade-offs in the management of social-ecological
systems from the perspective of the politics of scale, which
involves an explicit focus on the ways in which powerful actors
at larger scales of social and spatial organization influence the
policies and management of social-ecological systems at
relatively smaller scales. Although literature on the politics of
scale in political economy and political geography (Smith
1992, 1993, 1995, Jonas 1994, Agnew 1997, Delaney and
Leitner 1997, Swyngedouw 1997a,b,c, 2000, Howitt 1998,
Marston 2000, Brenner 2001, Escobar 2001), and more
recently political ecology (Brown and Purcell 2005, Cash et
al. 2006), has focused on assessing the strategies pursued by
individuals or groups across different spatial levels of social
1

organization to achieve a particular agenda, this paper
incorporates the basic insights put forward by theorists of the
politics of scale with the goal of quantifying differences in the
valuation of management alternatives across multiple spatial
scales of social organization.
Our central theoretical argument is that management
alternatives, each of which is associated with different mixes
of development and conservation goals, lead to the emergence
of asymmetric distributions of value for different social
organizational groups across spatial scales. We hypothesize
that conservation-oriented or development-oriented extreme
management scenarios generate higher value for international
and national scale social organizations, whereas mixed or
balanced management scenarios generate higher value for
local scale social organizations. Management of socialecological systems is thus a dynamic interplay of politics of
scale, creating and recreating winners and losers at multiple
spatial scales with the implementation of different mixes of
conservation and development policies. We explore this
hypothesis in the empirical context of management options at
Ruaha National Park (RNP).
Ruaha National Park (Fig. 1) covers approximately 10,300
km² and is the second largest of all the Tanzanian national
parks. RNP takes its name from the Great Ruaha River that
flows along its eastern border. The RNP is part of a series of
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conjoined wildlife areas, covering 50,000 km² and stretching
as far as Katavi in the west. A recent controversy arose from
the expansion of the RNP when the adjacent Usangu Game
Reserve was upgraded to a National Park status, and as a result,
residents of seven villages were relocated to other areas.
Fig. 1. Location of Ruaha National Park in Tanzania.
Source: http://www.tanzaniaparks.com/tanzania_map.html.

implications for the generation of winners and losers at
multiple spatial scales. First, the management of Greater
Ruaha watershed, which generates a significant amount of
hydropower for the national government, was perceived to be
threatened by keeping neighboring Usangu as a game reserve.
Second, the expanded boundaries of RNP made it the largest
national park in Tanzania, which was arguably better for the
conservation of biodiversity. Third, this annexation could
potentially improve the deteriorating wetlands of Usangu from
environmental degradation.
Local communities appear to have negative attitudes toward
conservation for a variety of reasons, such as the restrictions
imposed by the protected area authorities that deny local
communities access and user rights on natural resources for
agriculture and livestock production. The relocation/eviction
of villagers, according to these local communities, resulted in
the loss of arable land, settlements, and livestock during the
eviction process, and the eviction process interfered with their
cultural and traditional beliefs and rituals. Furthermore, the
local community respondents asserted that the national
government did not assist in making the new village
settlements conducive for human habitation such as providing
social amenities, e.g., schools, water, and dispensary. The
government promised to do this, but these promises have
remained virtually unfulfilled, according to the local villagers
interviewed. The national government representative denied
these charges.

The relocation of people to give way to the expansion of the
RNP produced a microcosm of management challenges that
are evidenced in the broader management of social-ecological
systems. On the one hand, the local villagers, who were
relocated, perceived that the process of estimating and
allocating compensation was not transparent. According to
these villagers, national regulations governing forced
relocation were also not observed and the relocated people
were impoverished. A local respondent, for example, stated
in an interview: “We are denied permanent employment
opportunities at the park, our people remain for years with
piece rate jobs - we think tribalism is the case.” Another
respondent stated: “By and large, we consider ourselves
unlucky by residing close to the park because our fishing,
hunting, and farming activities have been negatively affected.”
On the other hand, a representative of the national government
during a workshop contested these perceptions of the local
community disenchantment with the expansion of RNP. The
national government representative argued that a fair
compensation was provided to the local communities who
were relocated.
Multiple ecological factors have been cited for elevating
Usangu Game Reserve to the National Park status and
annexing it with RNP, each of which has differential

The Usangu-Ruaha conflict mirrors the larger conservationdevelopment conflict for the management of social-ecological
systems at the global scale. Many of these conflicts arise in
the postcolonial context of historical grievances and
contestations of benefits sharing among social organizations
at different spatial scales. The conservation community has
for decades struggled with, and argued over, the spatial
distribution of costs and benefits that accrue from natural
resource conservation practices such as the eviction of local
communities from the expansion of RNP (Adams and
McShane 1996, Songorwa 1999, Agrawal and Redford 2006,
Brockington et al. 2006, Wilkie et al. 2010). The costs of
conservation actions, e.g., evictions of local communities, are
imposed on local and indigenous communities while national
and international communities enjoy the benefits of ecological
conservation. Conversely, political economists have argued
that the environmental costs of open-ended development
actions, i.e., extinction of animals and plants, are also typically
imposed on local and indigenous communities while national
and international communities enjoy the benefits of
globalization and economic development. This leads to a more
general hypothesis that larger scale social organizations derive
higher net benefits from pure conservation or pure
development management options whereas smaller scale
social organizations derive lower net benefits from such
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“pure” management options. In this study, we focus on
estimating multicriteria and multiscalar value functions for
conservation, development, and other “mixed” management
options, with particular emphasis on the valuation differences
across spatial scales. In particular, we explore the following
hypotheses with respect to the conservation management
option:
●

Null Hypothesis: The management option of ecological
conservation through national parks provides equal value
to local, national, and international level social
organizations.

●

Alternate Hypothesis: The management option of
ecological conservation through national parks provides
higher value to international, followed by national, and
least of all local level social organizations.

Conservation that requires eviction of local/indigenous
communities for the protection of biodiversity is only one of
the many available management options. Similarly, at the
other end of the conservation-development spectrum,
development that causes extinction or degradation of
biodiversity is also only one of the many available
management options. There are other mixed management
options that can potentially be more responsive to the
pluralistic values of local and indigenous communities as well
as provincial and national level governments. Buffer zones
and multiuse management options provide alternate mixed
development paths to the one envisioned under either pure
conservation or pure development management options. A key
question is how a government should evaluate these alternate
management options. We describe a deliberative multicriteria
decision analysis (MCDA) approach that was used to gain
insight into the estimation of cross-scale valuation trade-offs
for alternate management scenarios of RNP. The limitations
of this approach are also discussed as well as the results and
the discussion of these results in terms of politics of scale.
METHODS
Theoretical approach
In recent literature on environmental policy and socialecological systems (Vatn and Bromley 1994, Bromley 1998,
Norton and Steinemann 2001, Vatn 2002, Norton and Noonan
2007, Norgaard 2010), there appears to be an emerging
consensus to use “development paths” as a unit of analysis for
evaluating alternate management options. For example,
outlining the elements of a deliberative pluralistic, multiscalar
(DPM) theory of ecological valuation, Norton and Noonan
(2007:672) suggested:
Development paths are ways our community/place
can develop over time and into the future.
Development paths can be thought of, alternatively,
as scenarios, but here scenarios are used creatively

and reflectively, to explore and evaluate possible
development paths according to multiple criteria
and not, as in economic models, as a methodological
tool to measure welfare change. Proposed policies
can be understood as interventions to modify or
stabilize systemic effects on community or place, and
simulations can be used to explore how policy
options might lead to varied scenarios.... Proposed
policies, and the development paths they are
modeled to shape and encourage, can then be
evaluated on multiple criteria, including economic
criteria (such as job creation and comparative
efficiency of different institutional means to achieve
improvements on key criteria), but also including
longer-term impacts on ecological systems....In this
way we can choose development paths to protect a
range of human values, recognizing the multiple
ways humans value nature.
MCDA enables elicitation of value trade-offs as a structured
participatory mechanism for groups of multiple stakeholders
to iteratively discuss incommensurate values and evaluate the
weights on those values for choosing valuable actions.
Building upon Norton and Noonan’s (2007) idea of alternate
development paths, we formally define a multicriteria
expected value function Vik for ith development path in a set of
n development paths by kth stakeholder as in equation 1:

(1)

Where wjk is a weighting or Trade-Off function for jth criterion
in a set of m criteria by kth stakeholder; and xijk is an “outcome”
or “impact” function for ith alternative on jth criteria as
perceived by a kth stakeholder in a group of K stakeholders for
a set of n alternatives. For an individual decision maker, the
most valued development path is the one with the highest Vik.
A considerable challenge is how to aggregate Vik across groups
of multiple stakeholders for choosing a development path that
reflects the pluralistic values of all affected stakeholders.
Formally, this aggregation challenge is represented through
the assignment of Ψk for aggregating Vik to estimate the societal
value Vi of ith development path, as shown in equation 2:
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(2)

their concerns in any given problematic situation. In real world
situations, powerful participants may use explicit or implicit
forms of power to influence the participation or the position
of weaker participants.
Table 1. Procedural heuristic of deliberative MCDA.

Substituting Vik from (1) in (2) yields equation 3:

Steps

Procedures

1
2

Develop a group consensus on management scenarios
Develop a group consensus on criteria (mutually
exclusive and typically incommensurate)
Individuals assign weights on criteria
Individuals assign their perceived impacts on a
constructed scale for each scenario by each criterion
and scale
Individuals participate in small group discussion to
develop consensus on weights and perceived impacts
Workshop level weights and perceived impacts are
developed
Workshop level weights and perceived impacts are
multiplied to evaluate scenarios
The valuation process is repeated iteratively with
different set of stakeholder representatives

3
4

5

(3)

6
7
8

Equation 3 provides one of the many possible MCDA methods
to assign multicriteria values on alternate development paths
conditional upon the weights assigned to different
stakeholders, the weights assigned by each stakeholder on
different values in the system, as well as the impacts perceived
by different stakeholders for each alternate development path
vis-à-vis each value in the system. Here, we formally stipulate
that a process issue in aggregation refers to how a stakeholder
is included or excluded from the set of K stakeholders.
Furthermore, we define that a power issue in aggregation refers
to the problem of assigning Ψk weights to a kth stakeholder. In
a perfectly egalitarian society, Ψk will be equal for all
stakeholders, which is rarely the case in real societies. Power
asymmetries can be explicitly represented through the
asymmetric assignment of Ψk. Because formal MCDA cannot
endogenously determine K and Ψk, we propose the deployment
of deliberative and softer version of MCDA applications, as
also argued by Martinez-Alier et al. (1998). In particular, we
propose a continuous and iterative application of an open
ended eight-step deliberative procedure, which is shown in
Table 1, to estimate multicriteria value functions for alternate
development paths as demonstrated in equation (3).
Limitations: power dynamics and process issues
Deliberative MCDA approach is designed to work best when
processes entailing “ideal speech situations” (Habermas 1984,
1998) prevail. In real world situations, however, in particular
those involving North-South dynamics with the history of
colonization, we are often far from ideal speech situations. For
example, ideal speech situations require that all participants
be given a fair opportunity to participate and deliberate about

Deliberative MCDA methodologies also require extensive
computational and cognitive skills to be implemented by the
participants for authentic deliberations. In reality, as has been
extensively demonstrated in decision theoretical research,
many participants are averse to forcing themselves out of their
comfort zones or routines and assigning constant-sum weights
to values or comparing the impacts of different design options
vis-à-vis different values. A more serious problem, known
widely since the days of Howard Raifa (1968), concerns the
assumption that values be mutually exclusive for assigning
constant-sum weights. Although decision theorists have
designed very sophisticated value mapping methods to
implement the requirements of this value exclusivity
assumption, it is very challenging and linguistically daunting
to map exclusive values. When it comes to working across
linguistic and cultural boundaries, such as the case of working
in Africa, this kind of exclusive value enunciation challenge
becomes even more intractable because of the politics of
language and other power and process dynamic issues
discussed above.
Messner (2006:164) summed up methodological problems
with deliberative MCDA approaches: “what MCA method and
which participatory approach should be selected for a certain
evaluation problem? Who should determine the criteria? How
is double counting prevented? Who decides on the weightings?
Who is to be included in the participation process? How can
objective results be attained?” Furthermore, aggregation
issues, i.e., who should be assigned how much weight when
aggregating value functions in a given problem solving
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situation, have posed difficult challenges for participatory and
deliberative MCDA tools, as also discussed by Wilson and
Howarth (2002) and Howarth and Wilson (2006). All of these,
and other limitations discussed by Hisschenemoller and
Hoppe (1995), Pellizzoni (2001), Shim et al. (2002), Stirling
(2006), and Wittmer et al. (2006) are very tangible limitations
of deliberative MCDA methodologies and utmost attention
and caution must be observed while implementing such
methods in field settings and interpreting the data from these
deliberations for policy analytical purposes.
Notwithstanding these process and power dynamics, a number
of studies have been published that demonstrate the
applicability of a nonmonistic, value pluralistic, multicriteria
theory of valuation with a Habermasian deliberative bent of
communicative action (Martinez-Alier 2001, Wilson and
Howarth 2002, Howarth and Wilson 2006, Klauer et al. 2006,
Messner et al. 2006, Munda 2006, Norese 2006, Proctor and
Dreschler 2006, Renn 2006, Stagl 2006, van den Hove 2006).
This body of literature has emerged in parallel to the
deliberative value focused decision analytic models (Keeney
1988, 1992, 1996, Gregory and Keeney 1994, Keeney and
McDaniels 1999). Kiker et al. 2005 present a broad review of
studies that involve the application of multiple criteria decision
making models for environmental decision making.
Data collection procedures
A four-day research workshop was organized in Dar-esSalam, Tanzania in May 2009 to develop an integrative
framework for negotiating trade-offs between conservation
and development. The framework attempts to gain insight into
complex conservation and development trade-offs by focusing
analysis through three “integrative lenses” called, for short:
valuation, process, and power (ACSC 2011). The approach
described in this paper was an exercise in applying a valuation
tool (MCDA) while paying explicit attention to the limitations
of the application as a function of process and power issues.
The DPM theory of valuation (Norton 2005, Norton and
Noonan 2007) was applied in the form of a deliberative MCDA
exercise with 18 workshop participants during a four-hour
session in the workshop. The 18 participants represented
several disciplines from within academia, i.e., economics,
political science, ecology, sociology, biology, anthropology,
and relevant government and NGO representatives concerned
about the management of RNP. The majority of the
participants were part of a large interdisciplinary research team
that had undertaken sociological, ecological, political, and
economic research on various aspects of RNP on the case study
site during the three years prior to the workshop.
Representatives of local/national NGOs and relevant
government ministries also had extensive background
knowledge about the case study site at RNP.
Our focus in this paper is not on providing statistically valid
results, because this study applies a deliberative MCDA

methodology to elicit stakeholder values at multiple spatial
scales for a test demonstration of the politics of scale in the
management of social-ecological systems. More valid results
will require iterative implementation of this methodology with
all relevant RNP stakeholders, a task that could be
accomplished in the follow up research. The statistical analysis
reported here is for methodological demonstration purposes
only and could be replicated in field settings. Instead of
generalizability, our goal in this paper is to demonstrate the
variability in the distribution of expected values across spatial
scales under alternate management scenarios. We explicitly
acknowledge that the process and power issues directly affect
valuation, such as who is included and who is excluded from
such deliberations. The estimated variability in the distribution
of expected values across local, national, and international
scales for alternate RNP management options serves to
elucidate the politics of scale in conservation-development
trade-offs enacted through public policies and institutional
designs.
To contextualize the MCDA discussion for RNP, the
moderators (two of the authors) began the discussion by
focusing upon different management and design alternatives
for managing various socioeconomic and ecological problems
of the case study site (step 1 in Table 1). Five management
alternatives were consensually chosen as alternatives for
multicriteria evaluation. These alternatives were:
1. National park (business-as-usual scenario)
2. Game reserve area
3. Game control area
4. Multiple use area
5. Open area
Each of these management alternatives represents an alternate
development path that can unfold in the park with appropriate
environmental policy shifts at local, national, and international
scales of governance. The first development path is the
business-as-usual scenario, which requires no policy change.
For the case of RNP, the system boundaries are currently
designated as national park. The other four management
options are practically a mix of conservation-development or
purely development options, somewhat similar to the IUCN
categorization of land-uses in biodiversity hotspots. The five
categories used in this study have some similarities but also
some major differences from the six categories used by IUCN
(www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/pa/pa_products/
wcpa_categories/). IUCN six categories are (1a) strict nature
reserve; (1b) wilderness area; (2) national park; (3) natural
monument; (4) habitat/species management area; (5) protected
landscape/seascape; and (6) managed resource protected area.
This study’s categories are (1) national park, similar to IUCN
category 2; (2) game reserve and (3) game control area, both
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of which are modified versions of IUCN category 4; (4)
multiple use area, similar to IUCN category 6; and (5) open
area, which is not one of the IUCN categories. Note that IUCN
categories 1a, 1b, 3 and 5 are not included in this study.
Game reserve and game control areas allow exploitation of
animals as hunting game in future or present time frames,
respectively. Multiple use area allows some areas of the park
to be opened up to various development activities, e.g.,
tourism, mining, energy, while other areas are conserved. For
the fifth alternative, conservation requirements are totally
abandoned and park area is declared open to any economic
and/or anthropogenic exploitation. Notably, local communities,
which in the National Park scenario were required to emigrate
out of park boundaries, are not required to emigrate in the last
three management options.
Next (step 2 in Table 1), a group consensus was developed on
the multiple criteria for evaluation of these management
options. The following six criteria were consensually agreed
upon:
6. Economic welfare (GDP/Capita)

economic welfare at the international scale were least valued
by the participants. In other words, participants at the
individual level were willing to trade off socio-cultural values
and social equity at all spatial scales for the protection of
biodiversity and ecosystem services. Economic welfare at
local and national levels was also weighted relatively high,
typically higher than good governance and social equity, but
lower than biodiversity protection.
Table 2. Weighting Matrix: respondents were asked to assign
weight from 0% to 100% for each value dimension, so that
the total adds up to 100%. The third column shows the means
and standard deviations in () from the individual level
workshop respondents (N = 18).
Values

Spatial
Assign Weight
Dimension (0 to 100%)

Economic welfare (GDP/Capita)

Local
National
International

9.04 (9.06)
8.27 (4.93)
0.75 (1.36)

Good Governance

Local
National
International

5.79 (5.46)
5.65 (2.84)
2.82 (3.33)

Socio-cultural Values

Local
National
International

6.42 (5.03)
2.51 (2.90)
1.24 (2.39)

Social Equity

Local
National
International

5.52 (4.09)
4.04 (3.98)
0.83 (1.71)

Ecosystem Services

Local
National
International

8.36 (7.41)
8.27 (6.03)
4.14 (3.64)

Biodiversity Protection

Local
11.64 (20.18)
National
7.67 (5.62)
International 7.04 (5.35)

7. Good governance
8. Socio-cultural values
9. Social equity
10. Ecosystem services
11. Biodiversity protection
Because we were especially interested in scale issues
pertaining to different valuation criteria, for step 3 in table 1,
participants were asked to individually mull over and fill in
their constant sum weights for each of these six criteria along
three spatial scalar dimensions: local, national, and
international. Temporal scales were not included in this
particular application because of a shortage of available time,
but they can be added in future applications. An interactive
survey form, as shown in Table 2, was handed over to the
individuals for weighting. The participants were instructed to
assign higher weight (in %) to the valuation criteria that were
more important to them or they cared more about, and lesser
weight (in %) to the criteria that they cared less about for the
relevant spatial scale, with the constraint that all the weights
must add up to 100%. Of the 18 participants, 6 participants’
individually assigned weights did not add up to 100 (a range
of 95 and 118), and were rescaled to 100% for statistical
analysis.
Figure 2a shows the constant sum weights that were elicited
from 18 participants at the individual level. Biodiversity
protection, ecosystem services, and economic welfare at the
local scale were most highly valued by the participants, as
shown by relatively higher weights assigned to these criteria
in Figure 2a, whereas socio-cultural values, social equity, and

Total

100%

The 18 participants were subdivided into four groups for
intense deliberation about the weights and perceived outcomes
(step 5 in Table 1). The groups were labeled as (1) ecological
group, because it had mostly ecologists and biologists; (2)
national group, because it had government officials and
researchers working at the national level; (3) socioeconomic
and political group, because it had sociologists, economists,
and political scientists; and (4) international group, because it
had international participants.
For filling group level weights, participants were allowed to
keep their individually filled survey forms (Table 2) in front
of them while deliberating about assigning weights and

Ecology and Society 16(4): 7
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss4/art7/

Fig. 2. Predeliberative (panel a) and postdeliberative (panel b) weights elicited for valuation criteria, distributed by spatial
scale: error bars show 95% confidence interval around mean.

working to develop a group consensus. Figure 2b shows the
group level weights assigned by the participants after
deliberation. Clearly, the variance in figure 2b is much higher
than figure 2a, which shows the level of dissent among the
participants within and across the groups. The averages of the
assigned weights appear to be very similar after the
deliberation. However, there are some important differences.
First, social equity at the local scale was assigned higher
weight after the group deliberation, whereas good governance
at the local scale was assigned relatively lower weight (figure
2b), as compared with the predeliberation weights (figure 2a).
Second, biodiversity protection at the local scale and
ecosystem services at local and national scales were assigned
relatively higher weight in predeliberative individual level
(figure 2a), but economic welfare at the national scale was
assigned even higher weight than biodiversity protection and
ecosystem services after the group deliberation (figure 2b).
These differences are not statistically significant, presumably
because of smaller sample size, but slight shifts in average
weights did happen after the deliberation, though larger pattern
of trade-offs among the valuation criteria did not change.
Prior to congregating participants in groups, an impact
evaluation matrix (Table 3) was also provided to the workshop
participants for filling in, first at individual levels, and then in
deliberative groups. For this impact evaluation matrix, the

participants were asked to assess the impact of each scenario
vis-à-vis each of the seven criteria at three spatial scales on a
constructed scale. A normalized constructed scale was used
for all scenarios and criteria so the participants could focus on
the spatial asymmetric impacts of alternate management
scenarios. The constructed scale ranged from a value of 0
(adverse impact) to 100 (best impact), as shown in Table 3.
For example, in the first top left empty cell, as explained to
participants, they judged the economic welfare impact at local
scale if the business-as-usual (national park) management
alternative was continued, and so on for the other cells in the
impact evaluation matrix. In future extensions of this
methodology, environmental impact assessment and strategic
impact assessment studies can be combined with the proposed
deliberative MCDA methodology to incorporate uncertainty
information about the impacts of alternate management
options at various scales (for an example, please see Klauer
et al. 2006). However, such multiscale impact assessment
studies require a large amount of financial and human
resources, and face complex cognitive and computational
limitations when impact assessment data is normalized, e.g.,
through linear or vector normalization procedures. In contrast,
the constructed scale methodology deployed in this study is
cost-effective and readily incorporates the perceptions of
multiple stakeholder groups, which is different from the
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Table 3. Impact Evaluation Matrix: respondents were asked to assign a value of 0 (adverse impact) to 100 (best impact) for each
cell, row by row. The cells show the means and standard deviations in () from the individual level workshop respondents (N =
18).
Values

Economic welfare (GDP/
Capita)

Spatial Dimension

Local
National
International

Good Governance

Local
National
International

Socio-cultural Values

Local
National
International

Social Equity

Local
National
International

Ecosystem Services

Local
National
International

Biodiversity Protection

Local
National
International

National Park Game Reserve

12.50
(13.95)
72.50
(22.96)
39.72
(28.51)
29.44
(26.22)
50.83
(31.58)
48.89
(30.70)
27.33
(34.89)
25.83
(27.66)
25.28
(28.97)
8.61
(11.48)
36.11
(28.98)
30.44
(30.78)
53.61
(33.72)
72.50
(22.96)
67.72
(36.28)
57.22
(39.07)
80.28
(22.45)
78.56
(31.09)

expert-system based approaches that are generally used in
impact assessment studies. Furthermore, assessment of
impacts for qualitative criteria such as good governance,
socio-cultural values, or social equity inevitably requires
generation of proxy attributes and constructed scales.
Figure 3 shows the impact evaluation matrices for each of the
five management options in five panels, as perceived by
participants at the individual level prior to group deliberation.
There are some interesting discernible patterns that emerge
from the comparison of the five panels of Figure 3. For the
management option of national park (Figure 3a), participants

21.50
(15.35)
63.06
(22.50)
35.56
(31.14)
31.94
(23.46)
46.67
(29.30)
40.56
(25.66)
31.39
(27.69)
33.61
(23.75)
22.72
(26.90)
18.06
(17.99)
32.22
(22.37)
36.61
(26.90)
48.61
(32.16)
60.56
(25.31)
51.56
(31.24)
50.28
(32.69)
68.06
(22.03)
67.11
(28.45)

Game
Controlled
Area

Multiple Use
Area

Open Area

37.50
(18.80)
46.39
(21.20)
21.94
(20.59)
42.50
(23.21)
47.22
(27.61)
33.89
(27.36)
47.22
(27.61)
33.33
(24.07)
22.50
(23.02)
39.44
(25.60)
36.78
(23.95)
38.44
(22.22)
61.39
(27.59)
57.78
(24.08)
44.83
(23.32)
48.06
(27.07)
50.83
(23.02)
46.11
(25.65)

53.06
(26.13)
42.22
(25.79)
19.39
(19.59)
51.39
(31.75)
55.56
(28.64)
27.22
(19.79)
64.44
(23.06)
44.17
(31.91)
24.17
(29.71)
58.33
(25.14)
45.89
(27.30)
40.94
(32.63)
62.50
(29.86)
43.89
(29.53)
28.78
(19.81)
52.50
(30.54)
41.94
(26.41)
38.11
(28.42)

60.56
(37.33)
31.39
(25.99)
10.06
(13.37)
47.00
(36.91)
41.94
(35.65)
14.67
(19.30)
63.33
(31.90)
36.28
(35.68)
18.17
(32.30)
60.94
(29.80)
34.61
(29.77)
29.00
(36.05)
45.61
(34.04)
24.44
(28.52)
19.33
(20.25)
30.11
(35.79)
18.33
(25.78)
12.22
(16.46)

perceived much better impacts (closer to 100) for biodiversity
protection and ecosystem services, especially at international
and national scales, but the impacts on socio-cultural values
and social equity were considered to be more adverse (closer
to 0). These differences are statistically significant. National
park status is perceived to have a better impact for economic
welfare at the national scale but the local scale is perceived to
suffer very adverse economic welfare impact from keeping
Ruaha as a national park.
In contrast, Figure 3e shows the perceived impacts when RNP
is declared open area: biodiversity protection, ecosystem
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Fig. 3. Predeliberative impacts by valuation criteria and spatial scale for national park (panel a), game reserve (panel b),
game control area (panel c), multiple use area (panel d), and open area (panel e) options. Impacts are measured on a
continuous scale from 0% adverse to 100% best impact.
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services, and economic welfare at the international scale are
perceived to suffer the worst impacts from changing RNP to
the open area category. However, participants perceived that
this management scenario would have very positive impact
on economic welfare, social equity, and the protection of
socio-cultural values at the local scale. The management
option of multiple use area (Fig. 3d) shows an interesting
pattern of perceived impacts: although this management
option will have significantly adverse impact on the protection
of biodiversity and ecosystem services at the international
scale, participants perceive that this option will have a very
positive impact on the protection of ecosystem services and
socio-cultural values at the local scale. National scale level
impacts fall between local and international scales, as shown
in figure 3d. Similar patterns can be assessed in figures 3b and
3c for the management options of game reserve and game
controlled areas. Overall, the workshop participants appear to
have a consistent and sharper perception of the impacts on the
valuation criteria when different management options are
pursued. Larger sample size in follow-up studies will probably
further narrow the confidence intervals of these perceived
impacts. Group level perceived impacts (not shown here
because of paucity of space) are very similar to the individual
level perceived impacts (Fig. 3).

reject the null hypothesis that the management option of
conservation provides equal value to local, national, and
international communities. Figure 5a shows predeliberative
value for the national park management option for each
valuation criterion and spatial scale. The management option
of conservation provides higher value to international,
followed by national, and least of all local communities. In
contrast, the management options of multiuse area (figure 5d)
and open area (figure 5e) are perceived by the workshop
participants to provide highest value on all valuation criteria
at the local scale and the least value at the international scale.
Fig. 4. Valuation of alternate development paths, aggregated
at individual (predeliberative) and group (postdeliberative)
levels.

RESULTS
Although an intergroup level discussion can be carried out to
resolve the conflict at the workshop level, which we did not
carry out because of time shortage, we believe “aggregation”
of individual and group level results is an intransigent issue
from the politics of scale perspective. This is an especially
intransigent problem because it is very difficult to decide
whose preference should be given how much weight in the
final aggregation: should representatives of international
institutions be given as much weight as national level policy
makers or should local communities be given more weight?
Our proposed methodology enables explicit analysis of this
politics of scale and renders transparent the value preferences
of actors from social organizations at multiple scales.
If we assign equal weight to each participant at individual and
group levels and aggregate their expected values, as shown in
Figure 4, we find that individual participants placed the highest
expected value for multiple use area, followed by national
park, game reserve, game control, and open area, respectively.
However, at the group level, national park has a slightly higher
expected value than the multiple use area, and both dominate
the other three management options. We thus find that
individual level predeliberative MCDA seems to produce
different results than the group level postdeliberative MCDA.
The five panels of Figure 5 show the expected value results
from the predeliberative workshop data to test the spatial scale
hypothesis. From the demonstrative workshop results, we

DISCUSSION
The demonstrative application of the proposed participatory
MCDA methodology for eliciting value trade-offs at multiple
spatial scales shows that the current management option of
conservation at RNP is perceived to provide higher value to
international and national level stakeholder groups while local
communities living adjacent to the national park receive much
less value. This demonstrative result is hardly surprising and
is the subject of numerous other types of research concerning
conservation and its relationship to rural communities, and the
numerous interventions attempting to address such
discrepancies (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Hulme and
Murphree 2001, Brokington and Schmidt-Soltau 2004, Wells
and McShane 2004, Sunderland et al. 2008). However, the
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Fig. 5. Predeliberative expected value by valuation criteria and spatial scale for national park (panel a), game reserve (panel
b), game control area (panel c), multiple use area (panel d), and open area (panel e) options.
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connection of this spatial valuation discrepancy with politics
of scale literature is novel. Furthermore, the proposed
deliberative methodology provides a participatory mechanism
for a large number of stakeholder groups to engage in
structured discussions for elucidating and quantifying crossscale trade-offs. Therefore, from the demonstrative
application of this participatory methodology, we find that
although workshop participants were willing to trade off local
level social equity and socio-cultural values for the long-term
protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services, promotion
of economic growth at local and national levels is also
considered important by the workshop participants. The
management option of a multiuse area for RNP elicits the
highest value (on an individual aggregation basis), whereas
the management option of keeping RNP as a national park is
favored by two out of four groups (on group level aggregation).
Multiuse and game reserve management options are favored
by two other groups. The elicitation of value trade-offs at
multiple spatial scales provides sufficient information to
warrant additional research with multiple stakeholder groups
to assess the viability of current management of RNP and
devise alternate management plans that balance multiple
values.
The current management scenario at RNP provides an insight
into the politics of scale that is symptomatic of many similar
conservation type management scenarios in both developing
and developed countries. Transparent explication of spatial
distribution of value trade-offs enables an integrative analysis
to identify and discuss alternate management options that
could potentially balance the current politics of scale back
toward local level social organizations. When policies are
extreme versions of open-ended development, or on the
opposite end, an extreme version of regulated conservation,
larger scale social organizations appear to derive higher value
whereas smaller scale social organizations derive lesser value.
Because both explicit and implicit forms of power are available
to social organizations at larger scales, we observe this type
of politics of scale in the management of many different kinds
of social-ecological systems that are similar to RNP. In
contrast, the politics of scale could be potentially mediated by
designing nonextreme policies that balance conservation and
development goals. Further, quantification of cross-scale
value distributions could also provide insight regarding the
appropriate magnitude and direction of payments for
ecosystem services and other compensatory mechanisms from
international and national level to local level social
organizations in situations where balanced or mixed
management approaches are not feasible, a topic that could be
explored in future research.
CONCLUSION
We applied a deliberative and participatory multicriteria
decision analytical approach to quantify cross-scale pluralistic
value trade-offs for alternate management scenarios of socialecological systems. The elicitation of value trade-offs at

multiple spatial scales was made operational in the context of
management scenarios for Ruaha National Park in Tanzania.
Although there are significant computational and cognitive
limitations of applying such deliberative multicriteria decision
analytical methodologies, making hard choices requires hard
thinking and work in clarifying values, weighing values, and
exploring potential impacts of different management
scenarios at multiple spatial scales with respect to those
weighted values. Recognition of multiple values, multiple
scales, and the empowerment of local communities through
deliberative mechanisms could be made operational by the
deliberative MCDA methodology laid out in this study, and
could provide a viable ecological valuation methodology for
comparing management alternatives of social-ecological
systems and mediating politics of scale in the management of
social-ecological systems.
We demonstrated the variability, in some cases statistically
significant, in expected values across spatial scales for
different management scenarios. We explored the hypothesis
that conservation-oriented management scenarios generate
higher value for international and national scale social
organizations, whereas mixed or more balanced management
scenarios generate higher value for local scale social
organizations. The asymmetric distribution of value at
multiple spatial scales enables us to analyze the politics of
scale that has resulted in the current management scenario at
RNP and similar other social-ecological systems, which can
be seen as serving the values of national and international
levels of social organization, while the values of local levels
of social organization are traded-off. The quantification of
such cross-scale value trade-offs could provide useful
information in the future for the design of policy mechanisms
that transfer benefits from international and national to local
levels of social organization and, hopefully, reverse the current
course of politics of scale in managing social-ecological
systems.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss4/art7/responses/
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